Here's what happened

The French presidency of the Council during the first half of 2022 promises to be ambitious in terms of finalizing key legislative decisions where agreement with Parliament has to be found, such as on the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. President Macron has also set out broader goals for the European debate: “if I had to sum up in one sentence the goal of this presidency from 1 January to 30 June 2022, I would say that we need to move from being a Europe of cooperation inside our borders to a powerful Europe in the world, fully sovereign, free to make its choices and master of its destiny”. The practical implementation of this geopolitical strategic sovereignty will fill many Council meeting agendas. It impacts a myriad policy domains, including corporate governance, investment scrutiny, supply chain security, data and cyber security, and, of course, the climate change measures from the Fit for 55 program, as well as immigration and external border control.

The French Council presidency coincides with the French presidential election campaign and then election in April, and the parliamentary elections in June. French and EU media will scrutinize any success or failure of the French Council presidency with enhanced attention in light of the looming ballots, which will for sure add extra spice to EU discussions.

The Czechs take over the Council presidency in the second half of 2022, essentially focusing on the same priorities. The dynamics in the Council could well look different than what we have become used to. For one, observers are fascinated by the new German government. After 16 years of Angela Merkel and her CDU-CSU in power in Germany and dominant in the EU, the new coalition of SPD, Greens and FDP will no doubt put a different emphasis on various issues – especially when it comes to climate policy, the defense of democracy and fundamental rights in the EU and abroad. Whether the direct line of communication between fellow Christian-democrats Merkel and von der Leyen, bolstering the central role of Germany on EU policy making, will be replaced by new preferences with social democrat chancellor Olaf Scholz in charge, remains to be seen. No doubt the German Greens will increase their influence on EU policies, with foreign minister Annalena Baerbock in the driving seat. It is noteworthy that while there is no Commissioner from a Green party, the Greens are coalition partners in seven member-state governments. We can therefore expect a more critical attitude from the Council and Germany in particular when assessing Commission proposals.

Parliamentary elections are due in Hungary in April 2022. Whether the recalcitrant prime minister Victor Orban prolongs his tenure and tendency to challenge EU proposals, or a new a wind more favorable to EU policy making blows from Budapest to Brussels, will greatly influence the Council’s capacity to reach agreement on many sensitive files in hand.

Every new opening provides a chance for a reboot of some sort, however in French-Polish relations the starting point will still be pretty far from being a clean slate. In recent years it would be difficult to find an issue where Poland and France haven’t been at odds, starting with the disastrous withdrawal from the acquisition of the French-made Caracal helicopters. Other friction points included such fundamental areas as combating climate change or the understanding of the rule of law, as well as very particular issues such as EU policies on labor mobility.

Even the understanding of a key term to the French presidency – sovereignty – is antipodal between the two administrations. While the French would aim for collective European sovereignty, the current Polish government perceives it in a traditional, nation-state way and as virtue that should be defended, also from overly ambitious EU politicians.

There are, however, two aspects of Macron’s sovereignty where the Polish government and the French presidency might see eye to eye. First is the external border control, or defense - as the Polish government would put it. Both countries see the issue as pressing, Poland - because now it concerns its backyard, France - as a broader benchmark of EU’s capabilities.

Second is the energy policy. France leads charge to label nuclear power as “green” and make it eligible for preferential financing and lower tax rates. Poland, which has yet to build its first energy-producing nuclear facility, firmly supports this stance as it aims to make nuclear energy one of the pillars of its energy sector’s overdue transformation.

Although the chances for a fundamental realignment are meager, the individual cases where French and Polish interests overlap might produce a mutually beneficial mosaic, provided that preexisting differences don’t dwarf those particular truces.